One of the main objectives of transnational banking regulation over the past two decades has been the standardization of regulatory practices and the allocation of regulatory powers to minimize the regulatory burden for banks. The resulting division of labor between home and host country regulators strongly favors Home over Host; And the regulatory scope has continued to focus on entities rather than activities. This paper argues that this has created several blind spots in transnational regulation of fi nance. First, Home is unlikely to monitor and respond to risks that are unique to Host, even though they might emanate from activities of banks that are subject to their consolidated regulatory supervision. Second, Host, may have regulatory supervision over a subsidiary of Home's parent company, but may rely on Home to exert regulatory controls. Moreover, Host has little regulatory leverage if the parent bank side-steps regulatory restrictions imposed on subsidiaries by engaging in direct lending practices, or by channeling capital through entities that are not subject to similar regulations. Second, the continued focus on entity based regulation ignores the fact that the core function of banks, maturity transformation, is increasingly performed by non-bank institutions that escape the existing transnational regulatory framework. Against this background, this paper proposes effect-based regulation, which gives Host the power to regulate any activity that has a systemic effect on its fi nancial system, irrespective of who undertakes it and where it is carried out. The paper uses the recent example of Central and Eastern Europe during the global fi nancial crisis to illustrate the failure of the existing regime.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the quest for integrating financial markets into a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory measures aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Based on commonly agreed upon prudential standards, home country regulation and supervision has become the core principle in the design of most regulatory structures. This principle, first established as the "Basel Concordat" in a series of reports issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel, 2 has also informed financial regulation in the EU: Indeed, the European passport system--which allows a financial intermediary that has been duly licensed in one member state to offer financial services and establish branch offices in other member states without requiring additional regulatory approval in the host state-can be viewed as a strengthening of the home-host country regulatory principle.
This paper questions the soundness of this principle as the primary means for governing interdependent financial markets; it draws on the lessons from the global financial crisis, which has exposed the vulnerability of host countries' financial system to regulatory abstinence by home countries of trans-nationally operating financial groups. This problem has become 2 Note that the first "Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks' foreign establishments" of 1975 stresses cooperation and makes only general recommendations for the allocation of supervisory authorities between home and host country. However, by 1983 the notion that the parent company's home regulator would exercise consolidated supervision over the banks' worldwide operation, became well established. See "Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments" (May 1983) . Host country regulators retained supervisory control over subsidiaries located in their countries and were encouraged to prohibit the operation of a subsidiary in the event they deemed regulatory oversight by the parent to be inadequate. Nonetheless, as anticipated by the Principles, vesting consolidated supervision over the international banking group with the parent has undermined host country supervision. All BIS documents are available at www.bis.org.
acute due to increasing financial interdependence: As emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Latin America opened their borders to foreign financial investors they have witnessed large parts of their financial systems being taken over by foreign groups and capital channeled across their borders. 3 This in turn has exposed these host countries to risks emanating from activities of these foreign financial groups. Even the UKwith its long tradition of financial market development-has found itself at risk from parent banks in Iceland with extensive branch and Internet operations in the UK. 4 In contrast, existing templates for transnational financial regulation as embodied in EU law or the Basel Concordat are primarily concerned with the opposite scenario-namely risks emanating from a host country's failure to regulate a subsidiary to the parent company and its home market. Moreover, in a world of mobile capital, entity-based regulation captures only a fraction of capital flows-which can just as easily be channeled into direct lending, securities, or through unregulated financial intermediaries as through intra-group relations between parents and subsidiaries.
To address the new risk pattern of interdependent financial markets, this paper advocates existing arrangements with bias in favor of home-country regulators and a strong focus on entity-based regulation be supplemented with effect-based jurisdiction. While there is still a need for consolidated regulation of financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally, the global crisis has demonstrated that there is also a pressing need to 3 To be sure, the fact that liberalization of financial markets exposes the new destination 
Host's Dilemma
Host-for the purpose of this paper-is defined as a medium-sized country that has fully liberalized its financial markets. Three banks that are domiciled in the neighboring country Home (thus, they exist as foreign banks) own the majority of bank assets in Host. Host's financial system grows rapidly for a while thanks to the strategies pursued by banks from The standard solution to this misalignment of costs and regulatory jurisdiction is the centralization of regulatory powers. By creating a supranational regulator that undertakes to supervise financial groups operating in more than one country it is presumed that regulation can be optimized. fully internalize the costs of under-or over-regulation of financial markets.
Only if markets are fully integrated and the costs of market or regulatory failure are equally distributed will that be the case. Absent such conditions (and even in the relatively highly integrated European financial market they are still absent), conflicts will have to be resolved either within a single agency; or alternatively, among different de-centralized regulators.
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An additional benefit typically associated with centralization is the avoidance of a race-to-the-bottom whereby several host countries in competition with each other seek to attract foreign capital by lowering regulatory standards. The race-to-the-bottom argument is often invoked in policy debates, yet exit is much less common than often assumed and is dependent on industry specifics. 29 Races tend to be more common when physical relocation is not required to reap the benefits of a more countries may lose out in the competition for global capital if they impose host country regulations that are perceived to be overtly costly.
Transnational groups may decide to bypass them if they impose regulatory burdens that are not worth the costs in light of the expected benefits these markets have to offer. This, however, does not refute the notion of effectbased host regulation. Effect-based regulation gives host countries an option to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in the event that their financial or economic system might be inadvertently affected by a financial intermediary's actions, which they may choose to exercise or not. They may even commit ex ante not to exercise this option. That act alone should focus their minds on the fact that they are effectively relinquishing the responsibility to safeguard their domestic financial systems and they may therefore ask for some assurance vis-à-vis the intermediary or their home country regulators in return. 34 The home-host regulatory regime accomplishes the same outcome, but without the awareness or the political costs associated with an explicit abdication of regulatory power.
This analysis results in two conclusions: . First, centralization or vertical integration is not a panacea for resolving conflicting interests between home and host countries, customers and financial service providers, et cetera. Second, the benefits of centralization do not necessarily outweigh the costs of a decentralized system with partially overlapping jurisdictions that pursue different regulatory goals. While standardization of regulation may reduce the costs for firms ex ante, the total costs of incomplete ex ante regulation and ex post bail out may far exceed these benefits, moreover, such centralization tends to come at the expense of information. 35 Regulatory centralization is likely to reduce the collection and processing of localized information thus exposing the system to the vulnerabilities of local and unrecognized crises spreading throughout the system; thus, any compromise between a fully integrated centralized model and a more decentralized regime has to take into account that the need to collect information locally and to assess its local and system-wide implications will entail maintenance and coordination costs. As suggested earlier, effective coordination requires 'voice' and this presupposes leverage. The current home-host regulatory regime disarms host country regulators. By contrast, effect-based regulation is meant to level the playing field.
Towards Effect-Based Regulation
The deficiencies of the existing regulatory regime for global finance could be counteracted by centralizing regulation at the global level, or, alternatively, by devolving regulatory powers to (multiple) local agents.
This paper advocates the latter solution not only for political reasons but also on grounds of efficacy: Within the EU a centralized regulator might be feasible at some point in the future (although, interestingly, the global crisis has not been sufficient to achieve consensus on this 36 ), however, at the global level such an arrangement is unlikely (and given the size and diversity of global financial markets would be impractical regulatory responsibilities with the allocation of costs associated with regulatory failure; and Second, it should enhance rather than reduce the propensity for cooperation among regulators.
The current regime is deficient on both grounds: The allocation of regulatory responsibilities between home and host country under Basel
Concordat and even more so under existing EU regulations largely does not take full of account of the propensity for conflict between home and host country regulators. 38 The Basel Concordat-even in its most recent iterations-works from the assumption that the core of financial activities of a given intermediary take place in its home jurisdiction and that foreign activities comprise only a small share of its activities and thus only marginally affect the financial system of host countries. This explains the strong emphasis on home country regulation-which has grown rather than diminished over the past several years. However, the experience of CEE countries (and others) during the credit boom and the subsequent bust demonstrates that foreign markets have become critical growth markets for banks from over-banked countries and that despite regulatory efforts, foreign banks can come to dominate if not control entire domestic financial systems. If anything, the European regulatory regime is even more focused on home country regulation than the Basel Concordat. The
European passport system eliminates entry control except for 38 Earlier versions of the Basel Concordat mention the potential for conflict, but over time the role of home country regulators has been strengthened. The 1983 version talks about "complementary and overlapping" regulatory responsibilities between home and host country regulators. The 1992 version places the burden to challenge the proposed division of labor, which favors home country regulation on the host country by stipulating that "Inaction on the part of either authority will be construed as an acceptance of the division of responsibilities established in the Concordat". Thus, each authority is responsible for making a deliberate choice between accepting its responsibilities under the Concordat or initiating consultations on an alternative allocation of supervisory responsibilities for the case at hand", section 2 at page 4. To improve on the current regime it is useful to start with an analysis of the costs of regulatory failure that materialize in a financial crisis. These costs are born primarily by three constituencies: By the ordinary people in a country affected by a financial crisis who lose their savings, jobs, etc.; by the taxpayers in countries that have the resources to stabilize their own financial system (and possibly those of other countries that might exert spill-over effects); and by multilateral organizations such as the IMF which help stabilize the financial systems of countries that lack the resources to protect themselves and do not receive sufficient bilateral support.
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In light of this distribution of costs the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction should emphasize not entities and their domiciles, but the location where the positive and negative effects of financial services can be felt. Such an approach is also better suited for the mercurial nature of financial services and the risks associated with them. In the past, the failure of deposit taking banks has been the major concern for regulators because of the systemic effect such a failure might have on the market in which that bank is 44 Note that the IMF finances itself not only from member contributions in the form of special drawing rights, but also from interests charged on loans. Indeed, in the 1990s, most of the revenue was generated from loans, implying that the countries at the receiving end of IMF funding were financing the organizations. When countries chose to pay back their loans to the IMF early and to avoid the IMF when in need of external finance, the IMF was forced to lay off a significant part of its staff. Yet, unless one is of the view that this problem is inherent to any form of regulation, it is secondary to the question of who should regulate. This paper focuses on the latter question; the former will be addressed in future research. 47 To be fair, they did this only after the true scale of the global economic crisis had been exposed and at least some of them received bailout money from taxpayer with conditions that prevented the use of these resources to stabilize foreign subsidiaries. At the beginning of the unfolding crisis, foreign parent bank cross-subsidized subsidiaries in Even then, the primary concern was legality of the banks' actions (and most where deemed legal, which they probably were) rather than stability concerns with respect to the foreign market affected by the lending This calls for an effect-based allocation of regulatory responsibilities: a domestic regulator should have jurisdiction over practices of financial intermediaries that have a material affect on the stability of their home market irrespective of the nature of the entity that undertakes these actions (a bank or a non-bank); whether or not the entity is domiciled within their jurisdiction; or whether the action is taken domestically or abroad. Effect based jurisdiction should complement-not replace--entitybased home-country regulation.
Two major objections can be raised against effect-based regulation in the area of financial services. First, such a regulatory system would impose excessive regulatory burden on globally active financial intermediaries and thereby undermine the process of financial globalization. Second, it may undermine rather than foster cooperation among regulators from different countries. With respect to the first argument it would seem that the global crisis has shifted the burden of proof to those who continue to advocate the benefits of unfettered global capital flows subject primarily to entitybased self-regulation. 50 Facing more than one regulator will increase the 49 The shift in lending strategy often increased the risk for the recipient markets, as direct loans tended to be denominated in Euros of Swiss francs rather than local currencies. 50 This line of argument is most aggressively pursued by the Institute for International home and host regulators, while at the same time singling out the home regulator for taking the lead. This is also true for the proposed "colleges of supervisors" 51 , which shall include home and host country regulators under the leadership of the home country regulator. As suggested earlier, this dilutes regulatory responsibility and invites free riding on presumed regulatory vigilance by the other side.
In contrast, effect-based regulation recognizes that host and home country regulators may have different, yet partly overlapping, regulatory objectives, and at times conflicting ones. Centralizing regulation is appropriate when multiple regulatory objectives can be aligned, or a social welfaremaximizing outcome can be identified ex ante that justifies giving higher priority to one objective over another. In this case allocating regulatory powers to more than one regulator would indeed lead to inefficient duplications. In contrast, separation of regulatory functions is sensible if and when regulatory objectives are in conflict with each other and it is difficult to determine ex ante, whether pursuing one objective or the other will be welfare-enhancing in the long term. The fact that regulatory objectives may conflict and that it is difficult for lawmakers and regulators to anticipate future contingencies strengthen the case for multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdiction. This will at times entail additional regulatory costs, as it is unlikely that regulators will reallocate regulatory powers among themselves to achieve an efficient outcome. The joint declaration strives to ensure the allocation of a case to a single regulator that is best capable of dealing with it, but does not allocate jurisdiction ex ante; moreover, it also recognizes that such consolidation is not always feasible in which the different regulators commit to cooperate with each other.
An important difference between the mentioned examples is that the issues at hand for the most part are and can be resolved in an ex post fashion, (i.e. after a case that might invoke multiple jurisdictions has arisen). In contrast, financial market regulation to be effective needs to be proactive, and when a crisis is imminent regulators need to have measures in place that can be implemented quickly, as they will have little time to coordinate at this stage. This calls for an early response system, 56 S. 2(1)(a) and 2(3) UK Competition Act 1998. one that encourages the sharing of information by multiple regulators and the coordination of measures aimed at preventing a crisis. The questions to be addressed in the following section are whether such a system already exists in the EU de lege lata, whether the reform proposals currently under discussion contemplate such a system, and if not, whether such a system anchored in effect-based regulation would be compatible with the Treaty and/or existing secondary EU law.
Legality of Effect Based Regulation in the EU
The existing regulatory regime for financial intermediation is rooted in 60 Specifically, Art. 58 (2) EU Treaty provides that member states are free "to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security." In addition, Art. 60 opens the possibility that in emergency cases member states may act unilaterally impose capital controls if the Council has not taken relevant actions. states. However, such interventions must be proportionate-that is-the host state must show that the rules of protection in the home state of the insurance provider are not adequate and that the host country regulations imposed are necessary in that respect. 62 In assessing the level protection provided in a given host state, the ECJ takes into account secondary
Community law aimed at standardizing minimum protection throughout the show that the insurance provider is not subject to similar requirements in its home country. 63 In the end, the court held that the requirement to establish a full presence in a host state was not shown to have been necessary to achieve these goals, but that the host country had less onerous means at its disposal. By implication, the Court confirmed the right of a member state to impose regulations if they can be justified on common good grounds, particularly in cases where community law remains incomplete.
In a more recent case, the ECJ had to rule on the legality of Germany prohibiting a Swiss financial intermediary from offering Internet loans to German customers. 64 The Court first affirmed that such host country restrictions on foreign financial intermediaries restrict the free movement of capital and services. In the words of the ECJ:
62 Ibid, recital 35. (1) and (2)). In the event that the home country regulator proves unresponsive, the host country may take "appropriate measures to prevent or to punish further irregularities and, in so far as is necessary, to prevent that credit institution from initiating further transactions within its territory" (Art. 30 (3)).
Furthermore, the host country may "prevent or punish irregularities committed within their territories which are contrary to the legal rules they have adopted in the interests of the general good" (Art. 31). These process of the adoption of these guidelines is indicative of the lack of real voice of countries, which had already turned themselves into major destinations of credit expansion from banking groups with seats in other EU member states. 81 While one might argue that most of these countries would be unlikely to effectuate effect-based regulation should they receive such powers, the existing governance structure gives them neither powers nor responsibilities to participate in the allegedly coordinative governance structure. Such an allocation of powers might be appropriate if the home countries of parent banks commit to bail out financial systems of voiceless host states in the event of a crisis -a commitment hat home country regulatory are unlikely to make.
The reforms triggered by the global financial crisis seek to strengthen EU level supervisory bodies rather than national regulators in host countries.
According to the proposal CEBS will be re-named the "European Banking Authority" 82 and receive management structure more akin to a full blown regulatory agency with a supervisory board, a management board, a fulltime chairperson, and a fulltime executive. 83 The in the event that Community law is not or inconsistently enforced. 85 While these measures create the impression that the EBA in conjunction with the Commission might function as a supranational regulator, the new regulatory structure is only as good as existing community law -including the guidelines developed by the EBA, and its ability to keep pace with market developments.
While the EBA now has the powers to step into the void should national regulators neglect to regulate credit institutions within their jurisdiction, their task is limited to enforcing existing Community law, determining whether a crisis has arisen and directing national supervisors to take actions in accordance with such law. Even in the event of a crisis the EBA it is explicitly prevented from taking decisions that "impinge in any way on the fiscal responsibility of Member States". 86 Given that emergencies typically require bailouts of one sort or another that affect a country's fiscal responsibility, this is a substantial carve out. Last but not least, the efficacy of this new agency will depend largely on its resources. According to the EBA Regulation, the budget shall comprise of obligatory contributions from national financial regulators, a subsidy from the Community, as well as fees paid to the Authority.
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In sum, the EBA is more akin to a supranational regulator than CEBS. In fact, the proposed regulation envisions that the EBA might be entrusted with "exclusive supervisory powers" over entities and/or activities with Community-wide reach. 88 Yet, it falls short of the powers, including enforcement powers, needed to effectively implement these tasks. imbalances between large and small countries, home and host countries of financial intermediaries. While the chairperson and executives shall be independent professionals, they too are appointed by the supervisory board, where decision-making power is geared towards de facto home countries. Last, but not least, the EBA Regulation further entrenches entity based regulation and the system of home-host country division of regulatory powers, which has been weakened by the greater marketization of financial services. This structure does not bode well for resolving Host's Dilemma.
Concluding Comments
The existing framework in Europe for governing transnational finance is insufficient for addressing the risks countries face that function as destinations for expanding multinational financial groups-specifically the kind of risks that have materialized in the global financial crisis. There is remarkably little evidence that the crisis was caused or deepened because of inconsistent application of community legislation. The key problem with the existing regime is the misallocation of regulatory powers given the distribution of risk and ultimately costs. Instead of addressing these problems the reform proposals further entrench the 'voice' 89 of home country regulators in EU institutions. What remains for host countries is 'loyalty' and the hope that their interests will be considered more carefully in the future in light of the harm a systemic failure of their markets can inflict on other member states and the Union. 
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